If bonobos can represent a partner’s ignorance and are motivated to communicate based on this mental state attribution, they should point more frequently, and more quickly, to the hidden food’s location when their partner is ignorant about that location than when he is knowledgeable. Bonobos indeed flexibly adapted the frequency and speed of their communication to their partner’s mental state. These findings suggest that apes can represent (and act on) others’ ignorance in some form, strategically and appropriately communicating to effectively coordinate with an ignorant partner and change his behavior.
Bonobos point more for ignorant than knowledgeable social partners
bonobos are not only capable of representing another’s ignorance (13, 14) but can act on these representations to effectively communicate and coordinate with another agent.
our results suggest that apes possess a flexible ability to use theory of mind for communication and coordination, that is neither modality- nor context-specific. High point accuracy across both conditions suggests that bonobos were able to act upon their own knowledge of the food’s location, while also recognizing when the experimenter was in a state of ignorance.
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