@sherrie miranda "Uncertainty about the army's attitude caused the American minister to request that a warship be held in readiness at Panama for hasty deployment to San Salvador, but a visit to the Salvadoran capital proved unnecessary as the officers remained loyal.9...
Tax reforms were stalemated by the intransigence of the landed classes. An attempt to reduce the military budget, which absorbed one quarter of the government revenues, failed in the face of defiant officers who refused to obey orders providing for their retirement...
Immediately following the revolt, while the situation was still in a state of flux, the Department of State announced that United States policy would be based on the 1923 Treaty, implying that recognition would be denied to the revolutionaries....Secretary of State Stimson found it necessary to explain the treaty to his minister, and caution him to act in accordance with its stipulations. An early enquiry prompted Curtis to reply on 5 December: The Department's telegram . . . assumes that I have made clear to the leaders of the revolution the policy of the United States, based upon the provisions of the Treaty of I923, regarding the non-recognition of Governments coming to power through revolution. This matter was constantly in my mind but I regret to have to report that I did not bring it to the attention of the revolutionary leaders until the success of the revolution was already certain...
Curtis was so frustrated by the difficulty of dealing with the military directorate, that he was evidently relieved at the general's emergence. He accepted the directorate's pledges that it would dissolve itself, and apparently believed that its elimination would enable recognition to be secured.25 Such an action would be to the advantage of Martinez. This was not in accord with departmental policy, which stipulated that all individuals involved in the coup or holding power by virtue of it must be eliminated."...Curtis accepted these arguments, concluding on 15 December: At this writing there is every indication that the Military Directorate has ceased to exist in fact as well as in name and that the de facto government headed by General Martinez complies with all the provisions of the Salvadoran Constitution provided due allowance is made for the fact that President Araujo's departure from the country can hardly be considered to have been voluntary. Consequently, Curtis advised recognition of Martinez.32...Caffery also observed: 'The military element is now in complete control of the situation and the country at large is now accepting their control almost with enthusiasm '.3.....
rioting. The government moved rapidly, declaring nationwide martial law and ordering the execution of anyone in possession of leftist propaganda....British and Canadian warships hastened to the scene, and at one point a British landing party embarked in small boats and circled the harbor of the capital for three hours before returning to their vessels.48....
These firm measures caused much of the populace to rally around Martinez, for all property owners were alarmed by the uprising of landless peons, and sought protection. In addition, the abortive revolt offered an opportunity to eliminate opponents of the de facto regime, and a brutal repression followed....53 The State Department was clearly willing to accept a solution which technically satisfied the treaty while leaving Martinez in power...American businessmen active in Salvador approached the State Department, attempting to present arguments based on the efficiency of the provisional administration....
Martinez directed an appeal to the Honduran Foreign Minister through masonic channels... 'The British Ambassador called and inquired when we were going to pull off a counter-revolution in Salvador'. 64 Although Department officials were aghast at such an inquiry, it was hardly surprising, in view of British policy and the American efforts to force Martinez from office. When the United States refrained from further action, the British accorded recog-nition to Martinez in September 1932, just in time to renew a commercial pact which was on the verge of expiring....
The Salvadoran episode demonstrated the ineffectiveness of non-recognition and the inadvisability of a rigid policy that prevented a flexible response to varying situations. While the initial confusion caused by the actions of Minister Curtis did allow Martinez to entrench himself in power, the fact remains that even in the face of a stronger stance a leader with sufficient determination and adequate domestic strength could effectively resist the American diplomatic pressure....
dictators. So
long as the United States remained unwilling to resort to force, any
strong-willed leader could seize
office and retain it. Nearly all incumbent isthmian regimes immediately took
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