the living person is chained to a dead body - the captured living person in a pirate ship - and as Aristotle states - this is the perfect metaphor for the soul in the body (tomb/corpse)....
The Spirit (πνεῦμα), on the other hand (δέ), discerns everything, but (δέ) it itself no one discerns.
Miroshnikov I (2022). A New Witness to the Fayyūmic Version of First Corinthians (P.MorganLib.
265). Part II: Notes on its Text-Critical Value, with an Edition of the Coptic Text. New Testament Studies 68,
206–230. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0028688521000357
https://shwep.net/podcast/ivan-miroshnikov-on-the-gospel-of-thomas-part-i/
https://www.academia.edu/video/lmXbD1
https://www.academia.edu/video/1wAyzk
"The person with the Spirit searches all things, yet they themselves are not subject to any person's evaluation." (NIV)
Or: "The spiritual person judges all things, but is himself to be judged by no one." (ESV)
- πνεῦμα (pneuma): Meaning "spirit" or "breath." In this context, it refers to the Holy Spirit or a person operating under the guidance of the spiritual realm rather than purely human intellect.
- δέ (de): A highly flexible Greek conjunction meaning "but," "and," or "on the other hand," used here to draw a sharp contrast between spiritual discernment and human misunderstanding.
- Discerns (ἀνακρίνει / anakrinei): This word implies a deep scrutiny, examining, or judging. The passage asserts that a spiritually-minded person can accurately evaluate the true nature of the world, while those without the Spirit cannot accurately evaluate or understand that spiritual person.
Ivan Miroshnikov
Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study, Linneanum, Thunbergsvägen 2, 752 38 Uppsala, Sweden;
Centre for Egyptological Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, 29–8 Leninsky Avenue, Moscow,
119071, Russian Federation
the Logos of Philo is functionally identical to other Middle Platonist intermediaries—e.g., to the demiurgic god (ὁ δημιουργικὸς θεός) of Numenius
(see fr. 12 des Places = Eusebius, Praep. ev. 11.18.6–8).76 Moreover, Philo was not
the only Middle Platonist who employed the term λόγος with regard to a meta-
physical principle.
In fact, the term seems to appear already in Antiochus, “a precursor of the
Middle Platonic synthesis.”77
Varro presents the Antiochean history of philosophy. A
part of Varro’s speech is a detailed account of the physical doctrines of the early
Academy (Acad. 1.24–29). According to Brad Inwood, “since we have no reason
to think that Antiochus distinguished his own views from those that he claimed
for the early Academy we can conclude that the account given here is a good
representation of Antiochus’ own theory as well.”78
According to Acad. 1.28–29, the world is held together by a force (“vis”)
described as “a sentient nature possessed of perfect reason (natura sentiens,
in qua ratio perfecta insit)” (trans. C. Brittain). This force is also called the
world-soul (“animus mundi”), an intellect (“mens”), a perfect wisdom (“sapi-
entia perfecta”), and God (“deus”). Cicero’s “ratio” most certainly corresponds
to the Greek term λόγος;79 thus, Logos, according to Antiochus, is the divine
force immanent in the world.
Finally, according to Numenius, matter, either by itself or as bodies, is not τὸ
ὄν, “that which is.” With respect to the latter option, matter as bodies, he points
out that bodies can hardly be “that which is,” for they always require something
to hold them together (τὸ καθέξον or τὸ κατασχῆσον). Such a cohesive principle
is necessary, since bodies are by nature “inanimate and dead, carried hither and
thither, and not abiding in one stay (τεθνηκότα καὶ νεκρὰ καὶ πεφορημένα καὶ οὐδ’
ἐν ταὐτῷ μένοντα)” (fr. 4a des Places = Eusebius, Praep. ev. 15.17.6; trans. E.H. Gif-
ford).57
These abundant examples from the Platonist and Platonizing sources
demonstrate that Gos. Thom. 56 and 80 seem to be drawing upon the Platon-
ist tradition. In addition, one more detail seems to demonstrate the extent to
which the Gospel of Thomas is indebted to Platonism. While the sources that
identify bodies with corpses are quite numerous, none of them employs the
word πτῶμα. In fact, there are relatively few Greek texts where the word πτῶμα
is used in the same way it is used in Gos. Thom. 56 and 60—i.e., meaning
“corpse” (the primary meaning of the word is “fall,” “act of falling”) and without
a modifier in genitive, as in τὸ πτῶμα τοῦ λέοντος in Judg 14:8 (see above, p. 47).
It seems that the rare word is used in order to provide the reader with a mem-
orable paronomastic slogan. As was pointed out above, the two notions (viz.,
bodies are tombs and bodies are corpses) were sometimes considered resonant
with and complementary to each other.
According to Numenius, the supreme
god himself (who is so consistently described as “standing”) is identical to τὸ
ἤρεμον, “that which is quiescent.”69 It is evident, therefore, that for both Philo
and Numenius immovability is intimately related to tranquility and peace.70
Therefore Numenius is a Platonist and not a true Pythagorean!
As Runia 1995, 200, points out, the similarity between Numenius’ and Philo’s treatment of
the theme of transcendental “standing” is rather striking. It is worth noting that, while Phi-
lonic influence on Numenius is impossible to prove, we can be certain that Numenius read
Jewish scriptures and gave them allegorical interpretation (fr. 1b des Places = Origen, Cels.
1.15; fr. 1c des Places = Origen, Cels. 4.51). It is possible, therefore, that in using “standing” as
an epithet of God both Numenius and Philo were inspired by the same biblical passages
(e.g., Exod 24:10).
“repose” that Gos. Thom. 50:3 pairs with “movement” hints at the notion of
divine immovability, which is intimately related to tranquility.
and so is the Gospel of Thomas - just Platonic b.s.
Now the modes of life of the first god and of the second are these: evidently the first god will be at rest (ἑστώς), while the second on the contrary
is in motion (κινούμενος).
According to Numenius, there is a paradox that lies at the core of ultimate real-
ity: the first god’s rest (στάσις) is his innate movement (κίνησις σύμφυτος) and
is the cause of the order, continuance, and preservation of the world. Previous
scholarship has noted that the notion of God’s κίνησις σύμφυτος could have been
inspired by Soph. 248e (quoted above, p. 139), where Plato attributes movement,
κίνησις, to “that which wholly is,” τὸ παντελῶς ὄν.92 Regardless of whether or
not he had this particular Platonic passage in mind, it is clear that Numenius
adhered to the idea that ultimate reality has a dynamic aspect. As Dillon puts
it, Numenius’ first god “produces the stability and order of everything else” and,
therefore, “must have motion in some sense.”
OK so Numenius is just confused....
Thus, both Numenius and Philo claim that the “standing” God moves and
rests at the same time. In order to describe this paradox, they introduce new
varieties of movement: κίνησις σύμφυτος, in the case of Numenius, and τονικὴ
κίνησις, in the case of Philo. I believe that these two examples of divine “motion-
less motion” are important for understanding Gos. Thom. 50:3
A similar statement occurs in Is. Os. 372f, where Plutarch argues that
“becoming is the image of being in matter and that which comes into being is
the imitation of that which is (εἰκὼν γάρ ἐστιν οὐσίας ἐν ὕλῃ ⟨ἡ⟩ γένεσις καὶ μίμημα
τοῦ ὄντος τὸ γινόμενον).”58 Interestingly, the last notion is repeated almost ver-
batim by Numenius, who says that ἡ γένεσις is εἰκὼν καὶ μίμημα of ἡ οὐσία (fr. 16
des Places = Eusebius, Praep. ev. 11.22.3).
Apuleius was also aware of the distinction between εἰκών as μίμημα and
εἰκών as παράδειγμα. The Latin term he employs is “imago.” In Plat. Dogm. 200–
201, he paraphrases Tim. 37d, saying that “truly, time is an image of eternity,
although time moves, while the nature of perpetuity is fixed and immovable
(tempus uero aeui esse imaginem, si quidem tempus mouetur, perennitatis fixa
et inmota natura est).”
